Vertical Restraints under EU Competition Law: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Framework by Petit, Nicolas & Henry, David
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1724891
 1
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW:  
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 





Each manufacturer seeking to convey goods or services to customers faces a basic, 
standard choice.1 It may either distribute them directly, through downstream vertical 
integration (integrated distribution), or it may entrust this task to specialised agents 
via the conclusion of a vertical agreement (independent distribution).2  
 
This paper focuses on independent distribution and how it is treated pursuant to the 
provisions of European Union (“EU”) competition law. Since the 1960s and the 
Consten and Grundig case,3 it is acknowledged that vertical agreements can entail 
restrictions of competition – generally called “vertical restraints” – which merit 
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1  See R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386; O. Williamson, Market and 
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, Free Press, 1975. Economists 
sometimes speak of  “hierarchy” (the firm) and “delegation” (the market) strategies. The choice of 
one or other method of distribution obviously varies according to the relevant sector, timing, and a 
company’s individual preferences. For example, with regard to the distribution of personal 
computers, though traditionally carried out using the independent distribution method, the past ten 
years have shown a growing trend towards integration. Clearly, the manufacturer may still decide 
to combine these two forms of distribution (“dual distribution”). Economic research and in 
particular, the “theory of the firm” has identified the main determinants of such choice. According 
to R. Coase, recourse to independent distribution leads to transaction costs (or governance costs) 
in terms of research, negotiation and performance problems. In contrast, under the integrated 
model, firms avoid (some) transaction costs as there exists a relationship of “authority”. However, 
their production costs increase in such an integrated model. There is, therefore, a trade-off 
between transaction costs and production costs.  
2  An agreement governing the relationship between the supplier and a distributor is generally 
termed a “vertical agreement” because it involves the cooperation of non-competing undertakings 
active at different stages of the value chain. Distribution agreements between operators at the 
same level of production process are called horizontal agreements. The integrated distribution 
model also raises competition law issues, which are generally assessed under the merger control or 
abuse of dominance rules. 
3  See Judgment of the Court of 13 July 1966, Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Etablissements Consten 
SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission, [1966]  ECR 299. 
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competition law scrutiny.4 While the early case law and regulations adopted in the 
field focused primarily on restrictions of intra-brand competition,5 and condemned 
many contractual clauses per se, regardless of their actual effects,6 a more liberal, and 
economic approach was introduced with the promulgation of Regulation 2790/1999.7 
For a long time, legal and economic studies had indeed cast light on the fact that 
vertical agreements had virtually as many pro-competitive effects as anti-competitive 
ones.8 Following one of the most vociferous debates in the history of EU competition 
law,9 a consensus emerged regarding the fact that competition authorities ought to 
focus on cases raising real competition concerns i.e. those where inter-brand 
competition (between competing goods or services) is actually hampered, so that any 
further restriction of intra-brand competition becomes problematic. Vertical restraints 
on tight oligopolistic markets were a case in point. On those markets, which are prone 
to collusive outcomes, competition between suppliers tends to be weak.10 
 
In response to this, the Commission initiated studies in 1997 with a view to reforming 
the law of vertical agreements.11 This process culminated in 1999 with the adoption of 
block exemption Regulation 2790/1999. The new legal framework, which represented 
                                               
4  A vertical agreement is defined in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation 330/2010 as covering: “an 
agreement or concerted practice entered into between two or more undertakings each of which 
operates, for the purposes of the agreement or the concerted practice, at a different level of the 
production or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may 
purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services”. According to Article (1)(1)(b) of the Regulation 
a “vertical restraint” means a restriction of competition in a vertical agreement falling within the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU - see Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories 
of vertical agreements and concerted practices (2010) OJ L 102 (“the Regulation”). 
5  A large number of contractual clauses that hampered competition between distributors of the same 
good or service (territorial exclusivity etc) were thus prohibited. 
6  During this early period, and for a considerable length of time thereafter, the analysis of vertical 
agreements was characterised by a distinct absence of a real and substantive nexus between law 
and economic analysis. Agreements between parties that did not enjoy market power could thus be 
prohibited by the Commission without any meaningful economic analysis being performed to 
substantiate such findings. 
7  See in this context S. Bishop, “Unfinished Business: The New Approach to Assessing Vertical 
Restraints”, Intereconomics,  January/February 2002.  
8  See, on this point, J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1988, chapter IV. 
9  See B. E. Hawk, “System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law”, (1995) 35 
CMLR 973. 
10  Network industries, in which there are natural monopolies or oligopolies, are typically an area 
where inter-brand competition is limited. 
11  See F. Wijckmans, F. Tuytschaever and A. Vanderelst, Vertical Agreements in EC Competition 
Law, first edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, paras. 1.51 et seq. 
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a radical departure from the previous approach,12 rested on a basic economic premise: 
the ability of a vertical agreement to produce anti-competitive effects hinges 
predominantly on the market power of the parties to the agreement (especially the 
supplier's market share, which reveals the degree of inter-brand competition). In turn, 
the system instituted a safe-harbour mechanism whereby any agreement between 
parties holding less than a predetermined “market share” (and which observed a 
(shorter) list of black clauses and conditions) could be presumed to benefit from an 
exemption under what is now Article 101(3) TFEU.13 Above the relevant market 
share threshold, a full assessment, known as an “individual assessment”, needed to be 
carried out in the light of the principles mentioned in a set of complementary 
Guidelines.14 In addition, the new legal framework also governed Internet 
distribution, which was not covered previously.15  
 
With the expiry of Regulation 2790/1999 on 31 May 2010, but also with the growth 
of massive retailers throughout Europe and the rise of Internet distribution (B2B or 
B2C), the Commission initiated a review process in July 2009. These factors therefore 
gave impetus to the recent reform process culminating in the adoption of Regulation 
330/2010 and of a new set of Guidelines.16  
 
Against this background the purpose of this study is provide an overview of the new 
legal regime applicable to vertical agreements. To this end, it is divided in five 
sections. Following this introduction, section II sets out the different types of vertical 
restraint and the theories of competitive harm ascribed to them. Section III offers a 
step-by-step overview of the method that should be followed by agencies, firms and 
their counsels with a view to self assessing – in the post notification era – vertical 
                                               
12  And more generally, marks the beginning of the “effects-based” approach in EU competition 
enforcement. 
13  From a legal practitioner’s point of view it may have been somewhat disappointing to see that the 
convenient lists of black, grey and white clauses applicable under the former regime had 
disappeared. In addition, notwithstanding the simplified regime resulting from the disappearance 
of a multitude of texts applicable to distribution agreements, legal practitioners viewed the reform 
as somewhat disconcerting as the new texts borrowed heavily from the nebulous jargon of 
industrial economics – witness the terms now used such as “market share”, “foreclosure effects”, 
“economies of scale”, etc. 
14  See Commission notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010) OJ C 130/1 (“the Guidelines”), 
para. 96.  
15  With the Internet’s rapid development and easy accessibility it became imperative to review the 
system of control of independent distribution agreements in order to align it with commercial 
realities. 
16  See supra notes 4 and 14. 
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agreements under EU competition law. Section IV deals with the issue of online 
distribution, which sparked intense controversy during the stakeholder consultation 
process. Finally, a brief conclusion is provided in section V. 
 
II. TYPES OF VERTICAL RESTRAINT 
 
1.  THE ISSUE 
 
With the paradigmatic shift towards an economic approach in 1999, and its 
confirmation in the recently adopted texts, EU law has migrated from a “form-based 
approach” to a so-called “effects-based approach”. Pursuant to Regulation 330/2010 
and the Guidelines, the nub of the matter is to determine whether a vertical agreement 
(or part of it), has actual or potential anti-competitive effects that are not outweighed 
by pro-competitive effects (or objective justifications).  
 
Within the new regulatory framework, six groups of vertical restraint, with distinct 
possible anticompetitive effects, can be distinguished.17 In line with the way 
economists work, the Guidelines ascribe one or more theories of competitive harm to 
each of these types of restriction and identify their possible countervailing objective 
justifications as well as pro-competitive effects. 
 
2. THE EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP GROUP  
 
2.1.  Notion of exclusive contractual relationships 
 
In an exclusive contractual relationship, a party to a vertical agreement relinquishes 
its freedom to contract with a third party. Its most drastic variant can be found in 
“single branding” arrangements, which limit a buyer’s ability to buy, resell or use as 
inputs competing goods or services.18 Less extreme declinations of exclusive 
                                               
17  The Guidelines also devote some space to other types of vertical restraints, such as franchising  at 
paras. 189-191 and tying at paras. 214-222. These issues will not be dealt with in the present 
paper. 
18  The idea here is to prevent the buyer from supplying itself with products of another brand. See the 
Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 129. Exclusive purchasing leads to a similar result but, as will be 
seen later, it responds to a significantly distinct definition. This explains why the Commission 
mentions exclusive purchasing in the same breath as vertical restrictions belonging to the 
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contractual relationships include quantity forcing,19 conditional rebate schemes, two-
part tariffs (fixed fee plus a price per unit), tying arrangements (where the sale of one 
product is conditional upon the purchase of another),20 or any other clauses (e.g. 
“English clauses”)21 or penalties which render more rigid the supplier/buyer 
relationship by encouraging the buyer to concentrate its purchases of goods or 
services with its customary supplier.22 
 
The Van den Bergh Foods case is a good illustration of an exclusive contractual 
relationship.23 A supplier of “impulse” ice cream had made freezers available to its 
Irish distributors for free. In return, the distributors were contractually required to 
refrain from storing other brands of ice cream in those freezers. 
  
An exclusive contractual relationship may also appear in the context of exclusive 
supply arrangements. Here, the supplier is obliged (or incentivized) to sell the 
contractual goods or services only (or mainly) to one buyer, in general or for a 
particular use.24 
 
2.2. Theories of competitive harm 
 
Drawing on economic theory, the Guidelines ascribe three theories of competitive 
harm to exclusive contractual relations, namely foreclosure, collusion, and reduced 
consumer choice. First, exclusive contracts may foreclose competitors’ access to 
outlets (in the case of single branding or long-term contracts, for example) or inputs 
(in the case of exclusive supply, for example). In a market subject to widespread 
single branding arrangements, a new supplier willing to enter the market has no other 
                                                                                                                                      
exclusive distribution group. The concept of a non-compete obligation would appear to cover both 
single branding and exclusive purchasing. 
19  The Commission still treats purchase quotas with a greater degree of leniency than exclusivity 
commitments. See for example, the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 154 
20  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para 214-222 
21  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 129. 
22  Contracts with penalty clauses may create a risk of foreclosure and deter entry. 
23 See Judgment of the General Court, Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, [1998] 
ECR II-2641. 
24  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 192. In the Guidelines, exclusive supply is treated, in and 
if itself as a type of vertical restraint.  
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choice but to set up its own distribution network (with the attendant costs and risks 
that this involves).25  
 
Second, collusion may be facilitated when all competitors make use of exclusive 
contracts.26 Collusion describes a situation in which rival oligopolists explicitly or 
tacitly agree to align their commercial policies. Because exclusive contracts rigidify 
the market shares of rival suppliers, they undermine oligopolists’ incentives to cheat 
from the collusive price through a price cut.27  
 
Finally, single branding may harm consumer welfare when the buyer is a retailer 
which deals directly with the final consumer.28 In such a setting, single branding 
reduces consumer choice within the point of sale.  
 
2.3. Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 
 
The economic literature is replete with articles arguing that exclusive contractual 
relationships have often objective justifications and pro-competitive effects.29 The 
Guidelines on vertical restraints take several of those findings on board. They focus, 
in particular, on three types of welfare-enhancing effect that may arise from exclusive 
contractual relationships. 
 
First, exclusive contractual relationships can neutralise free-riding amongst rival 
manufacturers. A free-rider problem arises when a manufacturer finances the pre-and 
                                               
25  This theory can be seen, in its strategic version, as a variation of the raising rivals’ costs theory, 
developed by Professor Salop. On this point see V. Korah and D. O'Sullivan, Distribution 
Agreements under the EC Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart, 2002), p.19. See T.G. Krattenmaker 
and S. Salop, “Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price”, 96 
Yale L.J. 209 (1986) 
26  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 151. 
27  See N. Petit, Oligopoles, collusion tacite et droit communautaire de la concurrence, Bruylant, 
Brussels, 2007, chapters I and IV. 
28  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 130. 
29  See B. Klein and K. M. Murphy, “Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution”, 
(2008)  75 Antitrust L.J. 433; G. F. Mathewson and R. A. Winter, “The Competitive Effects of 
Vertical Agreements: Comment”, (1987) 77  Am. Econ. Rev. 1057-1062, H. P. Marvel, “Exclusive 
Dealing”, (1982) 25 J. Law Econ. 1, I. R. Segal and M.D. Whinston, “Exclusive Contracts and the 
Protection of Investments”,(2000) 31 RAND J. Econ. 603 (2000), B. Klein and A. V. Lerner, “The 
Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates 
Undivided Loyalty”, (2007) 74 Antitrust L.J. 473, D. de Meza and M. Selvaggi, “Exclusive 
Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment”, (2008) 38 RAND J. Econ. 85. 
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post sales (advertisement, promotional expenses, training of workforce, etc.) 
investments of its retailers. This situation generates a “positive externality” which 
benefits rival competitors. Those consumers that have been drawn to the relevant 
point of sale thanks to the supplier’s promotional efforts, may eventually purchase a 
competing product.30 Exclusive contractual relationships, and in particular single 
branding,31 prevent competitors from free-riding on each others’ investments and, in 
turn, that suppliers refuse to make investments in the first place.32 
 
Second, in some sectors which often involve branded or positional goods/services, 
exclusive contractual relationships limit “certification of free-rider” issues. A 
manufacturer willing to introduce a new “premium” product/service indeed needs to 
sell primarily through retailers whose reputation is to stock only ‘quality’ products. If 
the manufacturer does not limit its sales to such premium stores, its product/service 
may be undervalued by customers, and its marketing strategy may be put into 
jeopardy. To convince ‘premium’ stores to sell the premium product, manufacturers 
may thus have recourse – at least for a certain period of time – to exclusive 
contractual relationships (such as exclusive supply, etc.).33   
 
Third, exclusive contractual relationships are often said to solve “hold up” issues.34 
Such issues arise when a buyer makes a “specific” investment as consideration for the 
performance of a vertical contract (an oil refinery builds a pipeline linking its 
facilities to those of a particular oil supplier). The investment is “specific”, because 
apart from the particular contractual relationship, it has no other value. It is, as 
economists would say, a “sunk cost”. Hostage of its own investments, the buyer ends-
up locked into a commercial relationship with the supplier and its product, and at the 
mercy of its bargaining power (the supplier may for instance engage in opportunistic 
                                               
30  See P. Rey and J. Tirole, “The Logic of Vertical Restraints”, (1986) 76 Am. Econ. Rev., 921.  
31  A single branding clause allows a supplier to ensure that its distributor focuses its efforts on 
marketing its product and only its product to the exclusion of the products of other suppliers. In 
addition, a distributor achieves economies of scale when it distributes a single product. See J. 
Tirole, supra note 8,  p.185. 
32 See H. Marvel, “Exclusive Dealing” (1982) 25 Journal of Law and Economics 1.  
33  Not for so long as to hinder large-scale dissemination, however. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, 
para. 107(c). Such benefits are more likely with “experience” or complex goods that constitute 
expensive purchases for the final consumer. 
34  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(d). For a discussion if the hold-up problem see O. 
Hart and J. Tirole, “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure”, Brookings Paper on Econ. 
Activity: Microecon. 205 (1990).  
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behaviour by discontinuing the supply of oil or by raising prices). To avoid the risk of 
moral hazard arising, the parties may enter into exclusive contractual relationships, 
for instance, by entering into a long-term exclusive contract, which specifies given 
quantities and a ceiling price.35 
 
3. THE RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE GROUP 
 
3.1. Notion of resale price maintenance 
 
Resale price maintenance (“RPM”) arises when a supplier imposes – directly or 
indirectly – a resale price on its buyers.36 RPM may take the form of a fixed, 
minimum or maximum resale price. RPM may also arise in disguise, however, when a 
supplier recommends a resale price but ensures its observance through incentives 
(payment of premiums, discounts or other benefits in favour of its distributors) or 
threatens to terminate the contract, for example. A rare example of the Commission 
dealing with this type of restriction is provided by the B&W case.37 In 2002 the 
Commission approved B&W Loudspeakers' notified selective distribution network on 
condition that the company remove several hardcore restrictions, such as a disguised 
resale price maintenance clause stipulating minimum retailer prices and margins. 
 
3.2.  Theories of competitive harm 
 
The theories of competitive harm ascribed to RPM assume that the supplier imposes 
the same price on all of its buyers. They borrow heavily from the economics of 
horizontal collusion. First, in ways similar to horizontal price collusion amongst 
purchasers,38 RPM eliminates price competition at the distribution level.39 Second, 
                                               
35  There are other ways to avoid this risk, for example by pooling the investment in a joint venture. 
See V. Korah and D. O'Sullivan, supra note 25, p. 32. 
36  A system of price-thresholds or minimum prices has the same effect. 
37  See Commission Press Release, 24 June 2002, Commission clears B&W Loudspeakers 
 distribution system after company deletes hard-core violations, IP/02/916, Brussels. 
38 The prohibition imposed on resale price maintenance is thus consistent with the primacy accorded 
by the Commission to the fight against horizontal collusion. The Commission – via its Guidelines 
– would appear to agree that resale price maintenance has detrimental consequences on 
competition by stating that resale price maintenance reduces or even eliminates intra-brand 
competition. See, for arguments in favour of a per se prohibition F. Van Doorn “Resale Price 
Maintenance in EC Competition Law: The Need for a Standardised Approach”, 6 November 
2009, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501070.  
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RPM assists horizontal price collusion amongst suppliers (tacit or explicit).40 Fixing 
resale prices makes it easier for parties to a horizontal cartel to monitor adherence to a 
joint line of action. Indeed, if prices are fixed at the resale level, a reduction of market 
shares at the upstream level can only be explained by the deviation of a cartelist.41 
Finally, RPM often entails a uniform resale price, which prevents efficient price 
discrimination by resellers (price discrimination leads to an increase in output and a 
more efficient recovery of fixed costs). 
 
3.3. Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 
 
The works of Lester Telser42 in the 1960s – and more generally of Chicago scholars – 
have shed light on the objective justifications, and possible pro-competitive effects, of 
RPM.43 First, RPM arguably allows suppliers to protect themselves against the risk 
that retailers engage in a race to the bottom in terms of prices, at the expense of 
quality of service.44 Second, RPM protects the image of certain branded or positional 
products, which would otherwise be less valued by customers (for instance, luxury 
goods). Third, suppliers will often use RPM to convince new operators to join a 
distribution network. Absent RPM, new operators are unlikely to join a distribution 
network for fear of facing aggressive price competition from incumbent retailers. 
                                                                                                                                      
39  Additionally, it ought to be noted that a system of maximum or recommended prices, in which 
resellers remain free to choose a lower or different price, in effect acts as a focal point around 
which distributors can converge. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para, 227: “The possible 
competition risk of maximum and recommended prices is that they will work as a focal point for 
the resellers and might be followed by most or all of them and/or that maximum or recommended 
prices may soften collusion between suppliers”. In other words, the Commission sees in this a 
strategy based on revealing information to competing suppliers regarding the optimal price level 
to be reached.  
40  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 224. See, in particular, B. Jullien and P. Rey, “Resale 
Price Maintenance and Collusion” mimeo, University of Toulouse, 2002; M. Motta, Competition 
Policy - Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004.  See 
also F. Mathewson and R. Winter, “The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance”, 
(1998) 13 Rev. Indus. Org. 57. 
41  Systems of resale price maintenance increase price transparency a corollary of which is an 
increase in the risk of tacit collusion in concentrated markets. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, 
para. 224. 
42  See L. Telser, “Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade”,  (1960) 3 J. L. & Econ. 86. 
43  See on these points, H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy - The Law of Competition and Its 
Practice, 2nd Ed, West Group, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1999, paras. 11.3-11.3.c.  
44  In order to make cost savings. On this point, the Chicago authors recognise that control of resale 
prices eliminates price competition. However, such systems do lead to competition on other 
equally crucial parameters. 
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Fourth, when both the upstream and downstream markets are subject to a monopoly, 
RPM eliminates risks of “double marginalization”.45  
 
4.  THE LIMITED DISTRIBUTION GROUP 
 
4.1.  Notion of limited distribution 
 
In a limited distribution system, a supplier restricts the number of distributors to 
which it sells goods or services.46 In a first variant, the supplier selects a limited 
number of distributors on the basis of a set of quantitative and/or qualitative 
conditions.47 This type of limited distribution is referred to as “selective distribution”. 
In a second variant, the supplier decides to appoint one distributor for a given 
geographic area (or for a category of customer). This type of limited distribution is 
referred to as “exclusive distribution” (or “customer exclusivity”).48  
 
4.2.  Theories of competitive harm 
 
Limited distribution systems are likely to trigger two types of restrictive effect on 
competition. First, limited distribution generates foreclosure concerns. Those buyers 
that do not belong to a limited distribution network are unable to obtain inputs from 
the relevant supplier. There is therefore a risk of “input foreclosure” which, 
depending on the market power of the manufacturer, in turn reduces intra-brand 
competition at the buyer level.49  
 
                                               
45  In certain markets, where both the supplier and buyer have market power, it is possible that supra-
competitive profits are made twice. In this context one normally speaks of “double 
marginalisation”. A supplier, wishing to protect its sales profits but also avoid a reduction in 
quantities sold at resale level can control the profits of its distributor by fixing downstream prices. 
See J. Tirole, supra note 8, p. 174. 
46  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 174. 
47  Conditions relating to personnel, premises, etc. The supplier may also impose an entry fee (for 
example, in franchise systems). See J. Tirole, supra note 8, p.184. 
48  Exclusive supply arrangements, which were discussed above, are drastic forms of limited 
distribution.  
49  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 175. 
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Second, because it is easier to coordinate amongst a small number of entities, limited 
distribution facilitates collusion – tacit or explicit – amongst purchasers.50 In addition, 
limited distribution facilitates collusion – tacit or explicit – amongst suppliers, 
because the monitoring of deviations becomes simpler with a limited number of retail 
outlets. This risk is particularly acute in cases of multiple exclusive distribution where 
several suppliers appoint the same distributor for the same territory.  
 
4.3. Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 
 
Most of the objective justifications for limited distribution are predicated upon the 
economic theory of incentives.51 In particular, Chicago school scholars have long 
argued that suppliers grant contractual protection to their distributors to stimulate their 
incentives to invest. On markets for durable and complex goods (cars, computers, 
stereos, etc.), distributors often provide essential pre and post-sales services such as 
consulting, testing, demonstrations, explanations of the relevant documentation, etc.52 
Those services come, however, at a cost, which in turn translates into higher prices. 
Distributors providing such services are thus vulnerable to the risk that consumers  
select a product within their point of sale, but subsequently purchase it from a 
different distributor who offers a more attractive price (precisely because it has 
incurred similar costs in pre and post-sales services).53  
 
To maintain retailers’ incentives to invest in pre-and post-sales services, and avoid 
this free-rider problem, suppliers may grant territorial protection, customer 
exclusivity, or enter into an exclusive supply commitment. More generally, such 
contractual protection is equally useful when a distributor must make an “initial 
investment” on a new market,54 undertake “promotional efforts”,55 or when it has a 
certain reputation for quality on the market.56 
                                               
50  Collusion between downstream buyers is facilitated because an understanding of the terms of 
coordination is simpler; monitoring activities is easier; and the risk of entry is reduced.  
51  See J.J. Laffont and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, 
Princeton University Press, 2001. 
52  Pre-sales services are  recognized in the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(a). 
53  See J. Tirole, supra note 8, p.183. 
54  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(b), which states “to open up or enter new markets”. 
55  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(a), which mentions the “free-rider problem”. Also 
note that the usual providers of capital (banks, equity markets) may provide capital sub-optimally 
when they have imperfect information on the quality of the borrower or there is an inadequate 
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In addition to such “incentives” effects, limited distribution engenders a range of 
“costs” effects. First, limited distribution triggers economies of scale, i.e. a reduction 
in the average total costs of production (the typical cost of each unit produced).57 For 
instance, in exclusive supply relationships, the supplier only deals with one buyer. 
Assuming that the supplier finances (part of) a buyer’s equipment, the fixed financial 
burden of this investment can be allocated over its entire production scale. In contrast, 
if the supplier has contractual dealings with several buyers, its investments in 
equipment would be multiplied and the fixed financial burden of each fixed 
investment would have to be spread over fewer quantities. As a result, its average 
total cost would be higher.58 
 
Second, limited distribution reduces the number of contractual partners of the 
supplier, and thus limits transaction costs (delivery, billing, monitoring, negotiations, 
etc.).59 
 
Finally, some types of limited distribution arrangements, and in particular selective 
distribution, allow suppliers to prevent “principal-agent” problems. Some retailers 
subject to competition may neglect quality of service ex post, and in turn harm the 
uniform reputation/brand image of the suppliers’ good. To alleviate such concerns, 
suppliers may apply ex ante selection systems (selective distribution),60 or 
contractually require that the distributors comply with a list of specifications in terms 




                                                                                                                                      
basis to secure the loan. The buyer or supplier may have better information and be able, through 
an exclusive relationship, to obtain extra security for its investment. Where the supplier provides 
the loan to the buyer, this may lead to non-compete or quantity forcing on the buyer. Where the 
buyer provides the loan to the supplier, this may be the reason for exclusive supply or quantity 
forcing vis-à-vis the supplier. See Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(h). 
56  See Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(c), referring to the “certification free-rider issue”.  
57  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(g). 
58  See J. Tirole, supra note 8,  p.193. 
59  See V. Korah and D. O'Sullivan, supra note 25, p.37, noting that such considerations were at the 
heart of the old laws which have since been abolished. 
60  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 174. 
61   In this type of distribution network, it is common to prohibit the resale of goods/services to 
unauthorized distributors outside of the network. 
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5. THE MARKET-SHARING GROUP 
 
5.1. Notion of market sharing 
 
Put simply, in a market sharing arrangement, a supplier restricts the venues where its 
buyers can purchase or sell contractual goods/services.62  
 
A first form of market sharing is exclusive purchasing.63 Here, a buyer commits to 
purchase exclusively from one particular supplier (for example, from a regional 
wholesaler) in order to meet its requirements of a given product/service. In contrast, 
the buyer cannot purchase from other suppliers of the same product (other wholesalers 
in other geographical regions).64  
 
A second conventional form of market sharing involves the resale side of the market, 
and often arises in the context of exclusive distribution systems (where each buyer is 
primarily responsible for the resale of the product/service on a given territory/to a 
designated type of customer).65 There is market sharing when a supplier restricts its 
distributors’ freedom to resell outside the assigned territory/designated customer 
base.66 In this context, a distinction is usually drawn between restrictions of “active 
sales” (the buyer cannot actively solicit customers outside its territory)67 and 
                                               
62  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 168. These territorial systems are more frequent when the 
downstream party is a wholesaler (as opposed to a retailer). 
63  See, for example, the many cases concerning exclusive supply clauses in the beer industry: 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-23/67, SA Brasserie de Haecht v. 
Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, [1967] ECR 525; Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, Case C-234/89, Delimitis, [1991] ECR I-935. 
64  However, unlike single branding, it retains the ability to buy and sell competing products. Single 
branding and exclusive purchasing are usually grouped together under the concept of non-compete 
obligations. 
65  On exclusive distribution, see supra section  II. 2. 
66  The supplier may also restrict its distributors’ ability to resell products/services to certain types of 
customers (business customers or private clients, for example). 
67  ‘Active’ sales mean actively approaching individual customers by for instance direct mail, 
including the sending of unsolicited e-mails, or visits; or actively approaching a specific customer 
group or customers in a specific territory through advertisement in media, on the Internet or other 
promotions specifically targeted at that customer group or targeted at customers in that territory. 
Advertisement or promotion that is only attractive for the buyer if it (also) reaches a specific group 
of customers or customers in a specific territory, is considered active selling to that customer 
group or customers in that territory – see the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 51. 
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restrictions of “passive sales” (the buyer cannot meet unsolicited orders from 
customers outside its territory).68  
 
Market sharing is polymorphous. In its purest form, a contractual clause may directly 
forbid the resale of products/services outside the relevant territory (or designated type 
of customer). Alternatively, the supplier may use indirect incentives (financial 
rewards or penalties) to encourage distributors to confine their deliveries to their 
assigned territory/customer base.  
 
The Nintendo case provides a good illustration of unlawful market-sharing. In a 2002 
decision, the Commission found that Nintendo and several of its EU distributors had 
colluded to artificially keep high price differentials across several Member States.69 
Under the collusive arrangement, each distributor was required to prevent parallel 
trade from its territory to other territories (parallel trade involves exports from low 
price countries to high price countries).70 In practice, Nintendo and several 
distributors had taken active steps to stem parallel trade. Distributors that had allowed 
parallel exports were punished through supply reductions (or even boycott). As a 
result of such conduct, the Commission meted out a €167.8 million fine on Nintendo 
and seven of its official distributors.  
 
5.2. Theories of competitive harm 
 
In a market sharing system, each buyer enjoys a monopoly over the resale of a 
product/service to a particular territory/type of customer. Intra-brand competition is 
thus entirely eliminated. If the degree of inter-brand competition is limited, each 
                                               
68  ‘Passive’ sales mean responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers including 
delivery of goods or services to such customers. General advertising or promotion that reaches 
customers in other distributors' (exclusive) territories or customer groups but which is a reasonable 
way to reach customers outside those territories or customer groups, for instance to reach 
customers in one's own territory, are considered passive selling. General advertising or promotion 
is considered a reasonable way to reach such customers if it would be attractive for the buyer to 
undertake these investments also if they would not reach customers in other distributors' 
(exclusive) territories or customer groups – see the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 51. 
69  See Commission decision of 30 October 2002, Video Games, Nintendo Distribution, (2003) OJ L 
255/33. 
70  In this case, there were striking price differences across Europe. According to the Commission, in 
early 1996 some Nintendo products were up to 65% cheaper in the United Kingdom than in The 
Netherlands and Germany. 
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buyer thus enjoys “significant market power” (the ability to raise prices significantly 
and durably above the competitive level).71 
 
In addition, market sharing is likely to thwart the integration of the Internal Market, 
when resale restrictions partition markets along national lines. In this variant, 
differentiated prices will prevail across Member States. This goes against the 
philosophy of EU market integration, which seeks to ensure homogeneous conditions 
for customers across the EU.72  
 
Finally, market sharing facilitates collusion. With market sharing, a buyer’s price cuts 
do not generate larger sales. Hence, buyers’ incentives to deviate from a tacit or 
explicit collusive equilibrium are limited. 
 
5.3. Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 
 
Even more clearly than exclusive distribution, market sharing eradicates free-rider 
issues, and may thus encourage buyers to invest in pre-and post-sales services. 
Importantly, such systems are often imposed by suppliers on – possibly reluctant – 
buyers who are prone to compete aggressively on price at the expense of quality.73 
 
6. THE BUYER POWER GROUP 
 
6.1 Notion of buyer power 
 
In mainstream competition economics, buyer power is traditionally seen as a 
disciplining factor against the market power of large suppliers.74 Strong buyers indeed 
have the ability and incentive to bring new sources of supply on the market in 
response to a small but permanent increase in relative prices.75  
                                               
71  Limited by inter-brand competition, both from other goods or services. 
72  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 100(d). 
73 Assuming that several distributors of a supplier are in a position to compete, one means of control 
at the supplier’s disposal is to segment the market between the relevant distributors by carving up 
sales territories. See J. Tirole, supra note 8, p. 472. 
74  See R. Inderst and G. Shaffer  in “Buyer Power in Merger Control”, ABA Antitrust Section 
Handbook, Issues in Competition Law and Policy, W.D. Collins(ed.) who define buyer power as 
“the ability of buyers to obtain advantageous terms of trade from their suppliers.”   
75  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 116. 
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In this context the Guidelines delve into unknown territory by turning buyer power 
into theories of competitive harm. The Guidelines seek in particular to offer guidance 
on two novel areas, namely upfront access payments (i.e., payment of fixed fees by 
suppliers to retailers in order to gain access to their shelf space – known as slotting 
allowances) and category management agreements (i.e. agreements where the 
distributor entrusts a given supplier – a “category captain” – with the marketing of a 
category of products, which include rival products). 
 
Such issues have, however, been dealt with at Member State level. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the Office of Fair Trading in the anticipated acquisition by 
United Biscuits (UK) Limited of the Jacobs Bakery Limited has recently grappled 
with the issue of category management. In this case, some competitors raised 
concerns about the power of the merged firm to further its own sales at the expense of 
those of its rivals using its control over the supermarkets through the category 
management process. In the context of this merger, the OFT did not, however, expect 
a retailer (particularly a major supermarket chain) to permit itself to be disadvantaged 
by its choice of category manager, or adherence to its recommendations.76 
 
6.2 Theories of competitive harm 
 
The Guidelines ascribe two theories of harm to upfront access payments. First, they 
may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure of (i) other distributors if such payments 
“induce the supplier to channel its products through only one or a limited number of 
distributors” and – exceptionally;77 (ii) of other suppliers where the widespread use of 
upfront access payments increases barriers to entry for small entrants.78 Second, the 
Guidelines state that, upfront access payments may reduce competition and facilitate 
collusion between distributors. According to the Commission upfront access 
                                               
76 Such that it resulted in a failure to provide an optimum product mix, which would have maximised 
the overall profitability of its biscuit range. See UK OFT decision of 10 September 2004 
(Anticipated acquisition by United Biscuits (UK) Limited of the Jacobs Bakery Limited) where it 
was also stated that category management involves a leading supplier providing expertise to the 
retailer to help it to maximise the profitability of each of its product ranges. This may involve 
providing research on the best way to market products and at what time, for example. 
77  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para 204. 
78  See the Guidelines, supra note 14,  para 205. 
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payments are likely to increase the price charged by the supplier for the contract 
products since the supplier must cover the expense of those payments. In turn, and 
without much explanation in relation to the collusion issue, the Guidelines consider 
that these higher supply prices may reduce retailers’ incentives to compete on price 
downstream, while the profits of distributors are increased as a result of access 
payments.79  
 
According to the Commission category management agreements generally do not 
raise competition law concerns. Yet, they may occasionally lead to the foreclosure of 
other suppliers “where the category captain is able to limit or disadvantage the 
distribution of products of competing suppliers”.80 In addition, such agreements may 
facilitate collusion between distributors when the same supplier serves as a category 
captain for all or most of the competing distributors on a market. In a rather terse 
manner, the Guidelines state that in such cases the category captain will provide a 
common point of reference for the distributors’ marketing decisions.81 More 
convincingly, the Guidelines consider that category management may also facilitate 
collusion between suppliers through increased opportunities to exchange sensitive 
market information.82  
 
6.3 Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 
 
As far as upfront access payments are concerned, the Commission recognises that 
they may lead to efficiencies such as the efficient allocation of shelf space for new 
products. In addition, they reduce the risk of free riding by suppliers on distributors’ 
promotional efforts.83 This is relevant in particular when suppliers are tempted to 
launch new products, which are suboptimal. With upfront access payments, the risk of 
commercial failure does not bear entirely on the buyer. In other words, upfront access 
                                               
79  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para 206. For a discussion of slotting allowances and their 
impact on the competitive process, see O. Foros and H.J. Kind, “Do Slotting Allowances Harm 
Retail Competition”, CESIFO Working Paper No. 1800, Industrial Organisation, September 2006. 
80  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para 210. 
81   See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para 211. 
82  The French NCA has issued an opinion on this subject, see 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/avisdec.php?numero=10-A-25 
83  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 208. 
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payments are a risk sharing mechanism, which limits the risk that suppliers will 
launch suboptimal products at the expense of buyers. 
 
As far as category management agreements are concerned, the Commission considers 
that they may allow distributors to have access to the supplier’s marketing expertise 
for a certain group of products. In particular, since such agreements are based on 
customers’ habits, they lead to increased customer satisfaction by satisfying demand 
expectations. Put simply, they ensure that the optimal quantity of products is 
presented directly on the shelves in a timely manner. 84 Moreover, such agreements 
generate costs economies for the buyer, which outsources the management of a 
category of products to a supplier. Finally, category management agreements generate 
economies of scale, as the cost of managing a category of products is merely incurred 
once (by the category captain), and can be spread over a wide range of products.  
 
III.  A STEP-BY-STEP METHOD FOR THE SELF-ASSESSMENT OF 
VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS  
 
With the increased risks stemming from the enforcement of the EU competition rules 
(i.e., swingeing fines, annulment and damages actions, negative reputation, etc.), 
firms should regularly self-assess vertical agreements through the lenses of Article 
101 TFEU.85  
 
To this end, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints suggest that “the assessment of a 
vertical restraint involves in general […] four steps”,86 which requires in particular a 
preliminary delineation of the relevant market.87 In our opinion, this somewhat 
complex method can be whittled down to a simpler two-step method. First, firms and 
their counsels should screen their agreement against a set of compatibility and 
incompatibility presumptions, which can be found in the Regulation and Guidelines 
(1). Second, only those agreements that escape such presumptions must be subject to 
                                               
84  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 213. 
85  For some enlightening proposals on this point see, see P. Lugaard and J. Haan, “Ten Points to 
Consider when Reviewing Regulation 2790/1999”, Global Competition Policy Online, March 
2009. 
86  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 110. 
87  Id. “First, the undertakings involved need to establish the market shares of the supplier and the 
buyer on the market where they respectively sell and purchase the contract products”.  
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a full-blown individual competition analysis (2). For the purposes of the present paper, 
we only deal with vertical agreements covered by Regulation 330/2010,88 and we take  
it as a given that trade between Member States is affected.  
 
1.  SCREENING OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS  
 
Since 1999, the law of vertical agreements relies extensively on presumptions.89 The 
Regulation and the Guidelines establish two sets of presumptions, which from the 
outset permit one to ascertain whether or not their purported vertical agreement falls 
foul of the EU competition rules. Pursuant to those texts, parties to a vertical 
agreement must first verify whether their purported agreement falls within the 
presumption of incompatibility provided for in Article 4 of the Regulation (1.1). 
Vertical agreements which fall outside this presumption of incompatibility may in 
turn be presumed compatible with Article 101 TFEU, if certain conditions defined in 
the Regulation and the Guidelines are fulfilled (1.2). As will be seen below, only 
those vertical agreements that do not benefit from those presumptions are subject to a 
full-blown individual competition analysis. 
 
1.1. The presumption of incompatibility 
 
1.1.1. Preliminary remarks 
                                               
88  See Article 2(1) of the Regulation, supra note 4. We therefore do not discuss agreements that fall 
outside the scope of the Regulation and the Guidelines i.e. (i) agreements between competing 
firms (with the exception of section 2(4) of the Regulation on non-reciprocal vertical agreements), 
(ii) agreements concluded within the framework of an association of retailers of goods (other than 
section 2(2) relating to relations between the association and its members), (iii) vertical 
agreements falling within a specific block exemption (see Article 2(5) of the Regulation), such as 
motor vehicle distribution agreements, (iv) agreements pertaining to leases and rental agreements 
(see the Guidelines, supra note , para. 26). We also exclude real agency contracts. A “real” agency 
contract does not fall within the purview of Article 101(1) TFEU. A “false” agency contract does 
on the other hand fall within the ambit of Article 101 TFEU. The dividing line between these two 
types of contract is drawn by reference to the criterion of imputability of financial and commercial 
risks associated with the contract. A real agency contract is one by which the agent bears no 
financial risk. Conversely, a false agency contract is a contract where the financial risk and the 
risks associated with the non-performance of contractual obligations is imputed to the agent. See 
the Guidelines, supra note 14, paras. 13-16. Article 101(1) TFEU is applicable to agency contracts 
when the agent assumes one or more of the following risks: the agent contributes to the costs 
associated with the supply of the goods or services (e.g. transport costs), the agent invests in 
promotional activities, the agent sets up and operates at its own expense an after-sales service or 
warranty system, the agent makes market-specific investments in equipment, facilities or staff 
training; the agent assumes liability vis-à-vis third parties for products sold, the agent assumes 
responsibility for the non performance of the contract by the customer etc. 
89  See F. Wijckmans et al., supra note 11, para. 1.52. 
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Article 4 of the Regulation sets down a list of five “hardcore restrictions”, 
(sometimes referred to as “black clauses”) whose presence in a vertical agreement 
ipso jure leads to (i) a presumption that the agreement as a whole restricts competition 
within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU; (ii) the exclusion of the application of the 
block exemption to the entire agreement;90 and (iii) a presumption that “the agreement 
is unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3)”.91 Such restrictions are thus 
subject to a quasi per se prohibition. There is therefore no need to undertake a 
painstaking assessment of the economic effects of the agreement. Moreover, the 
incompatibility rule affects the entire agreement, which is thus deemed null and void 
as a whole under Article 101(2) TFEU. 
 
Interestingly, and despite Internet players’ calls to that effect,92 Article 4 does not 
specifically target restriction(s) on buyers from selling goods/services on the Internet.  
In our opinion, the silence of Article 4 in relation to online sales is precautionary in 
nature. Absent any track-record on this issue, the Commission has seemed reluctant to 
cast in stone a restrictive solution, which could soon have become obsolete in sectors 
driven by rapid technological change.93 Rather, the Guidelines have favoured a case-
by-case approach, comparable to the approach taken notably in the French case-law.94 
 
1.1.2. Resale price maintenance 
 
                                               
90  They are of such gravity that the illegality of the clause in question affects the validity of the entire 
agreement, even where the market-share threshold (to which we shall return) is not exceeded. See 
the Guidelines, supra note 14, paras. 47-59. Such restrictions are not severable from the remainder 
of the agreement. This is important because other restrictions deemed inconsistent with Article 
101(1) TFEU (and not covered by Article 101(3) TFEU) after an individual assessment remain 
severable from the agreement (these restrictions are mentioned in Article 5 of the Regulation). 
Only such clauses are incompatible and the remainder of the agreement survives. See our 
comments below. 
91  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 47. 
92  See eBay’s “Empowering Consumers by Promoting Access to the 21st Century Market, A Call for 
Action”, p. 11. 
93  See LVMH submission concerning the review of the EU competition rules applicable to vertical 
restraints of 24 September 2009.The luxury product industry generally considers that the growth 
of online sales of luxury products, the continual adoption of new technologies for Internet 
advertising and sales make it impossible to adopt exhaustive legislation in this context.  
94 The approach taken by the French competition authority can be lauded as flexible, as it takes a 
case-by-case approach. See Decision of the French Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision no. 08-D-
25 of 29 October 2008 and the Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 29 October 2009. The Paris 
Court of Appeal referred to the Court of Justice a request for a preliminary ruling in the case  
Pierre Fabre Dermo Cosmétique S.A.S (Case C-439/09). 
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The first hardcore restriction targets RPM. It declares incompatible agreements which 
have as their object “the restriction of the buyer’s ability to determine its sales 
price”.95 Under such agreements, the buyer must observe a fixed (or minimum) resale 
price, set in the contract.96 Importantly, indirect RPM mechanisms are also caught by 
the prohibition.97 For instance, agreements setting a minimal profit margin98 or a 
maximum discount level are presumed incompatible.99 In contrast, a maximum100 or 
recommended101 price (or price level) is not in principle a hardcore restriction, unless 
it disguises an indirect RPM mechanism (when linked to the exertion of pressure, 
penalties or incentives).102   
 
                                               
95  Understood as the objective ability of the agreement and not the intention of the parties. See 
Article 4(a) of the Regulation and the Guidelines above, supra note 14, para. 48. For a discussion 
of RPM see O. Foros, H.J. Kind and G. Schaffer, Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on 
Dominant Firm and Industry-Wide Adoption, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2032, 2007; see 
also V. Verouden, Vertical Agreements: Motivation and Impact in Issues in Competition Law and 
Policy (W.D. Collins, ed.), ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008. See also F. Alese, “Unmasking 
the Masquerade of Vertical Price Fixing”, (2007) 28 ECLR 514 and M. Kneepkens “Resale Price 
Maintenance: Economics Call for a More Balanced approach”, (2007) 28  ECLR  656 . 
96  See Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-243/83, SA Binon & Cie v. 
SA Agence et messageries de la presse, [1985] ECR p. 2015;  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, Case 107/82, AEG/Telefunken v. Commission [1983] ECR  p. 3151. 
97  For an example of a clause permitting an undertaking to scrutinise the wording of dealers’ 
advertisements as regards selling prices and to prohibit such advertisements, see Judgment of the 
Court of Justice, Case C-86/82, Hasselblad v. Commission [1984] ECR  883. 
98  See in particular Commission decision of 16 July 2003, Yamaha, paras. 81-2 and 144, not yet 
published. 
99  The prohibition extends to some extent to mechanisms that ensure the monitoring and detection of 
distributors who do not respect the set price level. The existence of such mechanism raises 
suspicions of a concerted practice or vertical price fixing. It may be, for example, an obligation 
imposed on a distributor to denounce other distributors who depart from the standard price. See 
also with regard to agency the special case pertaining to a prohibition on the agent to share its 
commission with the customer. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 48, codifying the 
Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Case C-311/85, Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus, 
[1987] ECR 3801. 
100  The Commission considers that the obligation to apply a maximum resale price, i.e., in this case a 
multiplying factor of the sales price in France by Nathan on the same products is not restrictive of 
competition as such. See Commission decision of 5 July 2000, Nathan Bricolux, (2001) OJ L 54/1 
para. 87. 
101  The General Court has drawn a distinction between mere price recommendations and the 
imposition of strict rules relating to retail prices: see Judgment of the General Court, Case T-
67/01, JCB Service v. Commission, [2004] ECR II-49. See Judgment of Court of Justice of the 
European Union, Case C-191/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard 
Schillgallis, [1986] ECR 353, para. 25. 
102  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 48. And more generally, threats, intimidation, sanctions, 
suspensions or delivery delays discouraging a buyer from deviating from a recommended price. 
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Since the United States (“US”) Supreme Court Leegin ruling of 2007, the tough 
incompatibility rule applicable to RPM has sparked intense controversy in the EU.103 
In Leegin, the US Supreme Court abandoned the century old per se prohibition rule 
applicable to RPM,104 and subjected those practices to a rule of reason standard 
(which entails the balancing of the pro and anti-competitive effects of RPM).105  
 
As a possible result of this controversy, the Guidelines have manifestly relaxed the 
rigidity of the incompatibility presumption enshrined in Article 4(a) of the 
Regulation.106 The Guidelines explicitly state that the parties have the “possibility to 
plead an efficiency defence under Article 101(3) in an individual case”.107 The 
Commission thus apparently exhibits greater receptiveness to the efficiency gains 
arising from RPM.108 
 
This impression is further confirmed by the text of the Guidelines, which without 
claiming to be exhaustive, mention three types of justification for RPM.109 First RPM 
may “be helpful during the introductory period of expanding demand  to induce 
distributors to better take into account the manufacturer’s interest to promote the 
product” by incentivising them to redouble their promotional efforts for example.110 
Second, RPM may “be necessary to organise in a franchise system or similar 
distribution system applying a uniform distribution format a coordinated short term 
low price campaign (2 to 6 weeks in most cases) which will also benefit the 
consumers”.111 Finally, the Guidelines endorse the Telserian line of justification, in 
                                               
103  USC, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 127 S.Ct.2705 (2007). For further 
discussion on this subject see W.S. Grimes, “The Path Forward after Leegin: Seeking Consensus 
Reform of the Antitrust Laws of Vertical Restraints” (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 467. 
104 Which had been established in USC, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.S. 
373 (1911) 
105  See USC, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 59-68 (1911).  
106  See F. Alese and M. Kneepkens supra note 95 . 
107  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 223. See also para. 225 “RPM may not only restrict 
competition but may also, in particular where it is supplier-driven, lead to efficiencies, which will 
be assessed under Article 101(3)”.  
108  The Commission, at a roundtable discussion organized by the OECD in 2008, seemed prepared to 
explore all options within the framework of its review of the law pertaining to vertical restraints. 
The Commission indicated that the 1999 texts did not necessarily reflect its state of thinking on 
the issue. However, the Commission did express its doubts regarding claimed efficiencies arising 
out of resale price maintenance practices. OECD Competition Committee, Paris, 21-23 October 
2008. 
109  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 225.  
110 Idem. 
111 Idem.  
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stating that “in some situations the extra margin provided by [resale price 
maintenance] may allow retailers to provide (additional) pre-sales services, in 
particular in case of experience or complex products [sic]” and “prevent […] free 
riding at the distribution level” in relation to the provision of such services.112  
 
In theory, therefore, the parties are entitled to invoke some of the objective reasons 
identified by Chicago Scholars to counter a finding of incompatibility.113 That said, in 
practice, the flexibility introduced in the Guidelines could prove ineffectual. The 
majority of the efficiency benefits arising from RPM are indeed “qualitative” in 
nature. The various positive effects on distributors’ incentives are thus not easily 
amenable to economic quantification, as often required under Article 101(3) TFEU. In 
turn, it will often prove complex to balance the harmful quantitative effects of RPM 
against their qualitative benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU. As a result, the 
balancing exercise will inevitably hinge on a value judgment – which by its nature is 
variable, imprecise and subjective.  
 




The second hardcore restriction catches measures directly or indirectly restricting the 
freedom of a buyer from selling goods or services in certain geographical regions or 
                                               
112  Idem. See also E. Gippini-Fournier, “Resale Price Maintenance in the EU: In Statu Quo Ante 
Bellum?” Fordham Corp. L. Inst – 36th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and 
Policy, 2009 (B. Hawk ed., 2010).  
113  See the main justifications identified by Chicago Scholars in relation to resale price maintenance: 
:first, suppliers seek to protect themselves against the risk that distributors engage in a race to the 
bottom in terms of prices and may neglect the quality of service provided in order to make costs 
savings. On this point, the Chicago authors recognise that control of resale prices eliminates price 
competition. However, such systems do lead to competition on other equally crucial parameters. 
Second, suppliers sometimes seek to protect the brand image of their products (luxury goods 
industry, for example) from the risk that such goods are sold at rock-bottom prices. Third, 
suppliers impose resale prices in order to increase the density of their distribution network. 
Achieving density (i.e. the setting up of a significant number of points of sale) is expensive. 
Relevant costs are compensated by setting minimum prices which guarantees a minimum profit 
for distributors in the absence of which they would not distribute a given product for want of 
sufficiently extensive territorial coverage. Fourth, resale price maintenance is a means, for a new 
entrant, to persuade a distributor to market its products by offsetting the latter’s investment risks. 
Fifth, resale price maintenance can ensure that distributors make significant profits.  On these 
points see H. Hovenkamp, supra note 43. 
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to certain customers.114 Such restrictions are akin to “market partitioning”, and ought 
therefore to be presumed incompatible. Article 4(b) catches direct obligations not to 
sell to certain customers/territories, as well as obligations to dismiss orders from other 
customers/territories (or to refer to other distributors).115 Its scope of application also 
covers indirect measures which have the same effect, such as incentive schemes 
(conditional bonuses or discounts) and pressures (refusals to supply, threats to 
terminate the agreement).116 According to Article 4(b), the vertical agreement may, 




The Regulation brings four exceptions within the presumption of incompatibility.117 
First, restrictions of “active sales” into a territory (or to a customer group) granted 
exclusively to another buyer are not presumed incompatible. A sale is “active” when 
the buyer solicits customers located within the exclusive territory (or customer base) 
assigned to another buyer. In contrast, restrictions on “passive sales” are presumed 
incompatible. A sale is “passive”, when it originates from unsolicited orders of 
customers located in the exclusive territory (or belonging to the customer base) of 
another buyer.118 Restrictions of sales via the Internet,119 which the Commission 
deems to be passive and not active sales, are also presumed incompatible 
 
Pursuant to the three other exceptions enshrined in the Regulation, a supplier can (i) 
restrict “sales to end users by a buyer operating at the wholesale level of trade”; (ii) 
prevent “members of a selective distribution system to sell to unauthorised 
distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system” (iii) 
restrict “a buyer’s ability to sell components, supplied for the purposes of 
                                               
114  See Article 4(b) of the Regulation, supra note 4. 
115  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 50. The underlying rationale of such incompatibility is 
that buyers must be able to sell anywhere they wish. 
116  For other examples see the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 48. 
117  See Article 4(b) of the Regulation, supra note 4, and the Guidelines above, supra note 14, para. 51. 
These exceptions do not mean that the relevant restrictions are valid but they can, if the relevant 
conditions are met, qualify for an exemption. 
118  See the Guidelines, supra note 14 para. 51. See also Commission Decision, Video Games, 
Nintendo Distribution, supra note, 69, para. 331. 
119 See discussion in greater detail under section IV. 
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incorporation, to customers who would use them to manufacture the same type of 
goods as those produced by the supplier”.120 
 
1.1.4. Restrictions on active and passive sales in selective distribution networks 
 
The third hardcore restriction concerns selective distribution agreements. Pursuant to 
Article 4(c) of the Regulation, suppliers cannot restrict the territories/customers (in)to 
which selective distributors may sell to end-users.121 This presumption of 
incompatibility covers both active and passive sales. It thus goes further than the 
hardcore restriction enshrined in Article 4(b).  
 
Contrary to a common misconception, Article 4(c) does not forbid exclusivo-selective 
distribution networks. Suppliers can freely select distributors, and assign to them 
specific territories/customers (which means that suppliers will not sell 
products/services to other distributors within the same territory/customer base).122 
What is incompatible is to limit selective distributors’ ability to make active or 
passive sales to end-users located within the territory of other selective distributors. 
Similarly, suppliers can impose a restriction on the dealer’s freedom to determine the 
location of its business premises.123 This latter possibility permits suppliers to 
significantly impede the ability of pure Internet players (those without a physical 
infrastructure) to join a selective distribution network.  
 
                                               
120  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 55. 
121  See Article 4(c) of the Regulation, supra note 4, and the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 55. 
122  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 57. 
123  Idem. 
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1.1.5. Restrictions of cross-deliveries in selective distribution networks 
 
The fourth hardcore restriction also concerns selective distribution agreements.124 
Selective distributors must remain free to purchase the contract products/services 
from other members of the distribution network, operating either at the same or at a 
different level of trade.125  
 
1.1.6. Restrictions on component suppliers to sell to end users, repairers and 
independent service providers 
 
The last hardcore restriction covers agreements between component suppliers and 
buyers who incorporate them into their own products (OEM).126 OEMs may seek to 
reserve for themselves markets for repair and maintenance. In practice, they may 
restrict component suppliers’ ability to sell to end users, repairers or independent 
service providers.127 Article 4(e) thus presumes such restrictions incompatible 
pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU. The presumption of incompatibility also 
encompasses indirect restrictions, such as prohibitions on the component supplier to 
provide certain technical information to end-users.128 
 
1.2. The presumptions of compatibility 
 
Agreements devoid of hardcore restrictions may be presumed compatible with Article 
101 TFEU if they fall within one of the three safe harbours established under EU 
competition law.  
                                               
124  See Article 4(d) of the Regulation, supra note 4, and the Guidelines above, supra note 14, para. 55. 
125  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 58. 
126 See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 59. 
127  It may also seek to prevent mere repairs / maintenance of its product. 
128  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 59. The supplier may, however, impose on its own repair 
and maintenance network an obligation to purchase spare parts from it, and lay down a prohibition 
on dealing directly to the component manufacturer. 
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1.2.1. Agreements of minor importance 
 
a). The appreciability rule 
 
In the Franz Völk v. SPRL Ets J. Vervaecke judgment of 1969, the ECJ held that “an 
agreement falls outside the prohibition when it has only an insignificant effect on the 
markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on 
the market of the product in question”.129 The Commission codified this principle – 
the so-called “appreciability rule” or de minimis doctrine – in its Notice on 
agreements of minor importance of 2001.130 Pursuant to the Notice, vertical 
agreements in which no party holds a market share in excess of 15% are presumed not 
to appreciably restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.131 
This presumption of compatibility does not apply if the agreement contains a hardcore 
restriction.132   
 
b). The practice 
 
The determination of the supplier and buyer’s market shares requires a prior definition 
of the relevant product and geographic markets.133 The market share held by a firm 
indeed fluctuates with the size of the market under consideration. To take a simple 
example of this, Coca-Cola’s market share is likely to be insignificant if one takes the 
view that Coca-Cola operates on the wholesale market for soft drinks. Its market share 
is certainly higher, however, if one takes the view that Coca-Cola operates on the 
wholesale market for carbonated soft drinks with a cola flavour.  
 
Under EU competition law, the relevant product market comprises all products that 
consumers consider “substitutable by reason of the products’ characteristics, their 
                                               
129  See Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C 5-69, Franz Völk v. S.P.R.L. 
Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR  295 para. 7. 
130 See Commission notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(de minimis), (2001) OJ C 368/13.  
131  Idem. para. 7. 
132  Idem. para. 11(2). 
133 See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 88. 
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prices and their intended use”.134 The relevant geographic market “comprises the 
area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of 
products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogenous”.135  
 
In practice, an analysis of “substitutability” must be undertaken to delineate product 
and geographic markets. To this end, the most conventional technique consists in 
simulating the effect of a small, but significant and non-transitory increase in prices 
(5-10%) on the demand for the product (the so-called “SSNIP test”). If demand shifts 
to other products and/or neighbouring geographic areas, it can readily be assumed that 
these products and/or neighbouring geographic areas belong to a same relevant 
market.  
 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the definition of the relevant market is far from being 
an exact science. To take again our example above, how can one say with certainty 
whether Coca-Cola operates on the wholesale market for soft drinks, rather than on 
the wholesale market for carbonated soft drinks with a cola flavour? Of course, 
practitioners generally find assistance in decisional precedents, and in particular in the 
numerous decisions adopted by the Commission under the EU Merger Regulation. 
That being said, a large number of markets still remain to be defined by competition 
authorities.136  
 
Moreover, the calculation of the market shares poses a significant challenge. To 
compute market shares, parties need data on the total sales (for the supplier) and 
purchases (for the buyer) achieved on the relevant market.137 In principle, however, 
such data is unavailable to the parties, which do not – and should not – know the 
                                               
134  See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, [1997] OJ C 372/5 para. 7. 
135  Idem. para. 8. 
136  And where a relevant market analysis has taken place, it may relate to a different/obsolete 
economic context. 
137  See Article 7(a) of the Regulation, supra note 4. In the absence of reliable data on the value of 
sales, it is possible to rely on “estimates based on other reliable information concerning the 
market, including market sales volume”. The market share should be calculated on the basis of 
data for the preceding calendar year. See Article 7(b) of the Regulation. In the case of dual 
distribution of final goods, i.e. where the supplier acts as an integrated distributor towards its 
buyers which it controls, sales to the latter are taken into account for the purposes of calculating 
market share. See Article 7(c) of the Regulation and the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 95. 
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amount of sales and purchases achieved by their rival (and their 
customers/suppliers).138 
 
1.2.2.  Agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
 
The Guidelines exhibit a noticeable degree of sympathy towards SMEs (undertakings 
which have fewer than 250 employees, and have either an annual turnover not 
exceeding €40 million, or an annual balance-sheet total not exceeding €27 million).139 
Vertical agreements between SMEs are deemed “rarely capable of appreciably 
affecting trade between Member States or of appreciably restricting competition 
within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU”, and thus generally fall outside the scope 
of Article 101(1) TFEU.140 Should such agreements, however, satisfy the conditions 
for the application of Article 101(1) TFEU, “the Commission will normally refrain 
from opening proceedings for lack of sufficient interest for the European Union unless 
those undertakings collectively or individually hold a dominant position in a 
substantial part of the internal market”. 141 
 
1.2.3. Block exemption mechanism 
 
The third presumption of compatibility is the main feature of Regulation 330/2010.142  
Vertical agreements which observe a dual set of market share thresholds (a), as well 
as a range of conditions (b) are deemed to automatically fulfil the conditions for the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU.143 In some exceptional circumstances, the benefit 
of the block exemption may, however, be withdrawn (c). 
                                               
138  See P.M. Louis, “Le nouveau règlement d’exemption par catégorie des accords de transfert de 
technologie: une modernisation et une simplification”,, (2004) 3-4 Cahiers de droit européen 377, 
pp.385 and 403. 
139  See Annex to Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC. 
140  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 11. 
141  Idem. 
142  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 23, which refers to a “presumption of legality”. 
143  Technically, the Regulation relies on Article 101(3) TFEU to declare Article 101(1) TFEU 
inapplicable (Article 2 of the Regulation, supra note 4,, recalls that a finding of inapplicability of 
Article 101(1) TFEU finds its origin in the application of Article 101(3) TFEU). The important 
thing to understand here is that the Regulation assumes that the conditions for exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU are met. Recital 8 of the preamble to the Regulation states that agreements 
that do not exceed the market-share threshold “generally lead to an improvement in production or 
distribution and allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits”. 
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a). The double market-share thresholds 
 
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Regulation, a vertical agreement is presumed to benefit 
from the Article 101(3) TFEU exception rule: 
 
 “[…] on condition that the market share held by the supplier does not exceed 
30% of the relevant market on which it sells the contracts goods or services.” 
and 
 “the market share held by the buyer does not exceed 30% of the relevant 
market on which it purchases the contract goods or services”.144 
 
This “double market-share threshold” is a novelty. Interestingly, in 1999 the 
Commission tried to introduce a similar mechanism. The proposal attracted, however, 
widespread stakeholder opposition (lawyers seemed reluctant to undertake what was 
seen as overly complex economic assessments) and the Commission eventually opted 
for a single market share threshold.145 . Ten years later, criticism of market share 
thresholds has faded. Firms and their legal counsel are often said to appreciate the 
legal certainty afforded by such “safe harbours”.146 Despite this, however, it remains 
open to question whether (i) market shares are good proxy for inter-brand 
competition;147 and (ii) whether all firms contemplating the conclusion of a vertical 
                                               
144  In the event that the market share exceeds the threshold by 5% at the end of the initial assessment 
of the agreement, the Regulation (Article 7) provisionally allows the exemption to remain in place. 
If the market share is less than 35%, the agreement can benefit from the exemption for a period of 
two years. If the market share is greater than 35%, the exemption is only valid for one year.  
145  Under the legal regime in place under Regulation 2790/1999 the 30% market share rule generally 
only applied to the supplier (except in cases of exclusive supply).  
146  The term “safe harbour” is borrowed from the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 23. 
147 It is open to debate whether, from an economic point of view, the market-share thresholds 
constitute an effective screening mechanism for assessing vertical agreements. The market share 
thresholds are based on a structural reasoning, which borrows heavily from the teachings of the 
Harvard School (in particular, the SCP correlation between market share, market power and supra-
competitive prices). For an illustration of such structuralism see recital 4 of the preamble to the 
Regulation, supra note 4, which states that an individual assessment requires that “account [be] 
taken of several factors, and in particular the market structure on the supply and purchase side”. 
In a market of differentiated products (economists speak of monopolistic competition), market 
shares below 30% are not incompatible with the existence of significant market power. Moreover, 
it is open to question whether a rule based on the market shares held by the parties is really that 
effective for assessing the risks of oligopolistic tacit collusion. In fact, tacit collusion is a rare 
economic phenomenon which requires that – in addition to the presence of a tight oligopoly– 4 
cumulative conditions be met: mutual understanding of the terms of coordination (C1), detection 
of any risks of deviation (C2), the existence of a retaliatory mechanism (C3) and an absence of 
any challenge by forces that are exogenous to the oligopoly (C4). The issue of market share held 
by each party is of no particular importance. A situation of oligopolistic tacit collusion is indeed 
possible below the relevant thresholds. On the other hand, even in cases above the relevant 
thresholds it is possible that there is no risk of tacit collusion – if one of the conditions is not 
satisfied (C1 and C2, for example, where the market is not transparent). One may therefore 
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agreement, and in particular small ones, enjoy sufficient expertise to undertake the 
intricate industrial economics exercises (market definition and market share 
calculation) prescribed under Regulation 330/2010.  
 
In substance, the reason behind the introduction of an additional market share 
threshold is predicated upon a variant of “buyer power” (or monopsony) theory. As 
explained previously, in mainstream competition economics, buyer power is primarily 
viewed as a welfare-enhancing factor, which mitigates the effects of significant 
market power,148 to the direct benefit of end consumers (particularly so when the 
buyer is a retailer).149. 
However, with the vast expansion of retail distribution and the rise of gigantic players 
at retail level across Europe (in Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, etc.),150 concerns 
over the exploitation of monopsonistic buyer power have become more acute. In the 
context of vertical agreements, large distributors may impose on suppliers very low 
                                                                                                                                      
question the need to carry out a complex market-share threshold assessment with regard to the 
risks of collusion, while the agreement could simply be screened via a check against these four 
conditions. 
148  See, for instance, the Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings (2009) OJ C 45/7, para. 18: “Competitive constraints may be exerted not 
only by actual or potential competitors but also by customers. Even an undertaking with a high 
market share may not be able to act to an appreciable extent independently of customers with 
sufficient bargaining strength. Such countervailing buying power may result from the customers' 
size or their commercial significance for the dominant undertaking, and their ability to switch 
quickly to competing suppliers, to promote new entry or to vertically integrate, and to credibly 
threaten to do so. If countervailing power is of a sufficient magnitude, it may deter or defeat an 
attempt by the undertaking to profitably increase prices. Buyer power may not, however, be 
considered a sufficiently effective constraint if it only ensures that a particular or limited segment 
of customers is shielded from the market power of the dominant undertaking”. See also the draft 
Guidelines at para. 116: “In some circumstances buyer power may prevent the parties from 
exercising market power and thereby solve a competition problem that would otherwise have 
existed. This is particularly so when strong customers have the capacity and incentive to bring 
new sources of supply on to the market in the case of a small but permanent increase in relative 
prices”. 
149 In this sense, there has been only little, if no enforcement, of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU against 
monopsonistic practices. See Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 March 2007, Case C-95/04 P, 
British Airways v. Commission, (2007) ECR I-2331 where there was a dominant position on a 
purchasing market. See also the draft Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements, Brussels, 
SEC(2010) 528/2 which devote a full section to the competitive risks associated with collective 
purchasing. 
150  See Dobson Consulting, “Buyer Power and Its Impact on Competition in the Food Retail 
Distribution Sector of the European Union”, prepared for the European Commission – DGIV 
Study Contract No. IV/98/ETD/078 who report that “the largest Belgian company, Delhaize "Le 
Lion", is a retailer, Britain's Tesco and J. Sainsbury both appear in the UK top 10 companies; 
Germany has the giant Metro group; whilst Wal-Mart Stores, number four in the US, is the eighth 
largest company in the world with US$119bn turnover and 825,000 employees (Fortune, 3/8/98)”. 
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purchase prices, payment of listing fees or other (non) price advantages (upfront 
access payments). Under the previous Regulation, such agreements automatically 
benefited from a presumptive exemption as long as the supplier’s market share did not 
exceed 30%. To bring such agreements under in-depth competition law scrutiny, the 
new texts introduce an additional buyer’s market share threshold. Only those 
agreements in which the buyer’s market share remains below 30% are presumed to 
fulfil the Article 101(3) TFEU conditions. Other agreements, which possibly give rise 
to anticompetitive buyer power, must be subject to a full-blown, individual 
assessment. In other words, the new Regulation entails an extension of the substantive 
scope of EU competition law to new categories of agreements. This is further 
confirmed by the various new sections – discussed above– of the Guidelines devoted 
to up-front access payments and category management agreements.  
That being said, the economic theory of buyer power is far from settled.151 As 
indicated previously, since the works of J.K. Galbraith, mainstream economic theory 
views buyer power as a “countervailing” factor, which leads generally to lower resale 
prices. In a recent study, E. Pfister asserts that “invariably, buyer power is considered 
a factor of competitive strength”.152 In contrast, the main theories of harm associated 
with buyer power – albeit intuitively and theoretically valid– have not been confirmed 
empirically.153  
Moreover, those theories of harm often seem predicated upon disputable assumptions. 
With respect to category management agreements, for instance, the Guidelines state 
that they may result in anti-competitive foreclosure of other suppliers where the 
category captain is able to limit or disadvantage the distribution of products of 
competing suppliers.154 As other commentators have noted, it is however open to 
question why a retailer would allow a category captain to limit competition through 
                                               
151  For a discussion of buyer power see for example R. Inderst and C. Wey, “Buyer Power and 
Supplier Incentives” (2007), 51 European Economic Review 647; see also R. Inderst, “Leveraging 
buyer power”, (2007) 25 International Journal of Industrial Organisation  908.  
152  See E. Pfister “Puissance d’achat et politique de concurrence” Concurrences No 1-2009 1 Droit et 
Economie, p. 34, para. 45.  
153 Idem. para. 46. To the best of our knowledge, there is no case where the Commission has grappled 
with the anti-competitive effects of up-front access payments and category management 
agreements.   
154  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 210.  
 33
the foreclosure of rival upstream suppliers.155 A retailer has no interest in a limitation 
of upstream distribution, which will translate into increased input prices. Rather, the 
retailer, which strives to offer lower prices to end users, may simply use a category 
management scheme as an incentive device, to stimulate price competition amongst 
suppliers. In this setting, the retailer will appoint as the category captain the supplier 
which grants the largest price reductions. As long as equally efficient rival suppliers 
can compete for shelf management with the category captain, there is no foreclosure 
concern.156  
Finally, the fact that additional market shares must be calculated raises a practical, 
informational problem. Each party only enjoys “perfect” information on its own 
market share (but not on the other’s). Of course, the parties can exchange information 
on their market shares. Yet, one cannot guarantee that the exchanged information is 
accurate. In this context, economic theory shows that in situations of information 
asymmetry, “moral hazard” issues may arise. A retailer willing to conclude – or 
maintain – a vertical agreement at all costs may, for example, be tempted to share 
incorrect information with its potential supplier.157 In such case, however, both 
parties, including the one which acts honestly, may be held liable for infringing 
Article 101(1) TFEU.  
 
Because – from a legal policy perspective – normative standards ought to ideally be 
based on robust economic evidence, it would arguably have been wiser to (i) maintain 
the simple market share threshold of Regulation 2790/1999 for all agreements; and 
(ii) provide, exceptionally, that when – in certain sectors – buyer power is likely to 
give rise to anti-competitive effects (through the exploitation of suppliers, for 
instance), the Commission and National Competition Authorities (“NCAs”) can 
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption.158 
                                               
155  See P. Lugaard and T. van Dijk, “The New EC Block Exemption for Vertical Restraints: A Step 
Forward and a Missed Opportunity”, Global Competition Policy Online,  June 2010, p.5. 
156  In contrast, there may well be exploitation concerns. However, competition authorities across the 
EU often consider that such risks should not be dealt with as a matter of priority. 
157  Besides which, the system envisaged by the Regulation leads to an increased flow of 
commercially sensitive information at the distribution stage insofar as the distributor must, in 
order to determine its market share, know how much sales are made by its competitors.  
158 Under the former system, if the manufacturer held a market share below 30% – but the market 
share held by the distributor was above this threshold – the Commission had to use the individual 
withdrawal mechanism and was required to satisfy the heavy burden of proof for the application 





All agreements devoid of hardcore restrictions and which observe the double market-
share threshold are deemed compatible with Article 101 TFEU.159 That said, however, 
the parties’ contractual freedom is not absolute. Article 5 of Regulation 3320/2010 
identifies three types of restraint which occasionally appear in vertical agreements, 
and which ought to observe specific conditions. If these conditions are met, the 
restraint is deemed compatible, and this is the end of the self-assessment. If these 
conditions are not met, the restraint – and it only – cannot be deemed compatible. It 
must undergo a full-blown competition analysis. The rest of the agreement remains, 
however, covered by the presumption of compatibility.160  
 
Article 5 first targets “direct or indirect non-compete obligations”161 (i.e. single-
branding clauses and exclusive purchasing obligations).162 It provides that the block 
exemption only covers non-compete obligations for a period of no more than 5 
years.163 Any such obligation with an indefinite duration; of more than 5 years; or 
tacitly renewable beyond a period of 5 years, is excluded from the benefit of the block 
exemption.164  
 
Second, Article 5 focuses on “clauses prohibiting a buyer, after termination of the 
agreement, from manufacturing, purchasing, selling or reselling goods or 
                                                                                                                                      
distributors has the effect of freeing the Commission from this burden of proof and allows it to 
deny the benefit of a block exemption for this type of agreement 
159  In such circumstances, the parties can craft their vertical agreement as they see fit 
160  The clauses in question are severable from the rest of the agreement. They themselves cannot 
benefit from the exemption. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 71. 
161  See Article 1(d) of the Regulation, supra note 4, “any direct or indirect obligation causing the 
buyer not to manufacture, purchase, sell or resell goods or services which compete with the 
contract goods or services, or any direct or indirect obligation on the buyer to purchase from the 
supplier or from another undertaking designated by the supplier more than 80% of the buyer’s 
total purchases of the contracts goods or services and their substitutes on the relevant market, 
calculated on the basis of the value or, where such is standard industry practice, the volume of its 
purchases in the preceding calendar year”. 
162  Idem. 
163  Either its duration does not exceed five years, or its renewal beyond 5 years requires the express 
consent of both parties. 
164  The Regulation provides for a derogation from the maximum duration of 5 years when the 
contract goods or services are sold from premises and land which the vendor owns. As long as the 
buyer occupies the premises, a non-compete obligation is justified. See Article 5(2)(a) of the 
Regulation, supra note 4.  
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services”.165 Such clauses are in principle not eligible for a block exemption.166 The 
Regulation does, however, provide for an exception to this if the clause is: (i) 
indispensable to protect know-how transferred by the supplier to the buyer; (ii) 
limited to the retail outlet from which the buyer has operated during the contract 
period; and (iii) limited to one year following the expiry of the agreement. In fact, this 
exception primarily concerns franchising agreements, where the franchisor transfers 
important trade secrets to the franchisee.  
 
Third, Article 5 excludes from the block exemption clauses which impose “any direct 
or indirect obligation causing the members of a selective distribution system not to 
sell the brands of particular competing suppliers”.167 The purpose of this provision is 
to ensure that suppliers making use of selective distribution schemes do not foreclose 
access to specific competitors. In other words, the block exemption does not apply to 
practices which are akin to collective boycott.168 By contrast, the block exemption 
covers general non-compete obligations in the context of selective distribution 
networks. 
 
c). Withdrawal of the block exemption 
 
Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation 330/2010, the Commission is empowered to 
declare the Regulation – and in particular the block exemption – inapplicable to 
“vertical agreements containing specific restraints”. This exception applies only to 
situations “where parallel networks of similar vertical restraints cover more than 50 
% of a relevant market”.169 The Commission must issue a Regulation to this end.170  
 
                                               
165  See Article 5(1)(b) of the Regulation, supra note 4 and the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 68. 
166  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 60. 
167  See Article 5(1)(c) of the Regulation, supra note 4, and the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 69. 
168 See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 69. 
169  See F. Wijckmans et al., supra note 11, para. 9.08. Using the example of a market on which there 
are 4 competing manufacturers. Each has a market share of 25% and imposes on its respective 
distributors an identical single-branding clause. The cumulative effect of this network of 
agreements leads to the market being entirely foreclosed to new entrants. However, an assessment 
pursuant to the Regulation would have found the agreement valid because: (i) the relevant 
thresholds are respected and (ii) single branding does not as such constitute a black clause.  
170  See Article 6 of the Regulation, supra note 4. The ability to do this is based on Article 7 of 
Regulation 17/65, which has now been replaced by Article 29(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2003) OJ L 1/1. 
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In such cases, the Commission will carry out a full competition analysis of the 
agreement under Article 101 TFEU.171 This provision seeks to avoid so-called type II 
errors, which occur when a rule fails to regulate conduct that harms consumer welfare 
(false negatives or false acquittals).   
 
Finally, pursuant to Article 29(1) and (2) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and 
the NCAs can respectively withdraw the benefit of a block exemption in particular 
cases, if an agreement has effects incompatible with Article 101(3) TFEU.172 In so far 
as NCAs are concerned, this is only possible if those effects “occur in the territory of 
that Member State, or in a part thereof, and where such territory has all the 
characteristics of a distinct geographic market”.173 
 
2.  FULL-BLOWN COMPETITION ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL 
 RESTRAINTS  
 
2.1.  Preliminary remarks 
 
Agreements which fall short of the abovementioned screening principles must be 
subject to a full-blown competition analysis.174 The principles governing the 
individual analysis of such agreements are laid down in the Guidelines. Importantly, 
those principles must be applied on a case-by-case basis and not mechanically.175 
 
2.2.  Method 
 
Parties undertaking a full-blown competition assessment must first identify the 
anticompetitive features of their agreement, and the related theories of competitive 
harm (2.2.1). Second, the parties must test whether those theories of competitive harm 
                                               
171  See, for an illustration, Commission decision of 23 December 1992, Langnese Iglo GmbH, (1993) 
OJ L 183/19 and Commission decision of 23 December 1992, Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH’Co. 
KG, (1993) OJ L 183/1.  
172  See paras. 13 and 14 of Regulation 330/2010, supra note 4. 
173  See also Article 29(2) of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 4. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 
78. In this situation the Commission is also able to intervene if the case raises a particular interest 
such as the novelty of the relevant issues (see para. 80). 
174  Those are either (i) agreements where one of the parties has a market share in excess of 30%; or 
(ii) restrictions introduced into agreements which do not meet the requirements of Article 5 of the 
Regulation. 
175  See recital 3 of the preamble to the Guidelines. 
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are plausible in light of the market characteristics, and whether they are likely to give 
rise to a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU (2.2.2). 
Third – and only if there is a restriction of competition under Article 101(1) TFEU – 
the parties must verify if their agreement produces efficiencies and objective 
justifications which trigger the benefit of an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU 
(2.2.3).  
 
For the purposes of this paper, we take the illustration of a vertical agreement which 
contains a 3 year single branding clause, and involves a supplier controlling nearly 
40% of the relevant market. 
 
2.2.1.  Selection of the theories of harm 
 
Not all vertical restraints have a similar effect on competition. Economic theory 
ascribes specific scenarios of competitive harm to the various types of vertical 
restraint. A prerequisite of any meticulous self-assessment is therefore to “frame” the 
analysis by selecting a relevant theory of harm. 
 
As explained previously, the Guidelines provide a useful source of guidance on this. 
For each group of vertical restraint, the Guidelines articulate a range of possible 
theories of harm. To take the example of single branding, the Guidelines particularly 
mention risks of (i) “foreclosure of the market to competing suppliers and potential 
suppliers” (customer foreclosure);176 (ii) “collusion in the case of cumulative use by 
competing suppliers” (supplier collusion);177 and (iii) a “loss of in-store inter-brand 
competition where the buyer is a retailer selling to final consumers”.178 We assume, 
here, that there is no cumulative use of single branding in the market and that the 
buyer is not a retailer. In such a case, none of the latter two assumptions is relevant. 
The individual analysis can thus focus exclusively on the risk of foreclosure. 
 
2.2.2. Assessment of the theories of harm 
 
                                               
176  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 130. 
177  Idem. 
178  Idem. 
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The next step involves testing the plausibility of the theory of competitive harm in the 
light of the market features. In assessing any potential risk resulting from a single 
branding obligation the Guidelines consider that the following list of factors should be 
examined: the market position of the supplier,179 the needs of individual customers 
covered (100% or less),180 the market coverage of the single branding commitment 
(the tied market share),181 the duration of the non-compete obligation,182 the market 
position of competitors,183 barriers to entry,184 countervailing power (or purchasing 
power),185 and the level of trade.186 
 
The Guidelines provide details on those various factors. For instance, a single 
branding obligation whose duration is less than 1 year is deemed unlikely to generate 
anticompetitive effects. In contrast, single branding obligations between 1 and 5 years 
entered into by non-dominant companies will usually require a proper balancing of 
pro- and anti-competitive effects. At any rate, single branding obligations are more 
likely to result in anti-competitive foreclosure when entered into by dominant 
companies. 
 
The same applies to the tied market share. It is important to ascertain whether the 
point of sale that is foreclosed from rivals constitutes an important sales channel. If a 
supplier with a 40% market share benefits from a single branding commitment with a 
customer that accounts for 10% of its sales, the tied market share (i.e. 4% of the 
relevant market) is relatively limited. It is thus unlikely that the agreement restricts 
competition. If, however, the customer represents half of the sales of the supplier, the 
tied market share is much higher (i.e., 20% of the relevant market). Here, the 
restrictive effect of the agreement is considerably more serious.  
                                               
179  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 132. 
180  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 133. 
181  Idem. 
182  Idem. “Single branding obligations shorter than one year entered into by non-dominant 
companies are generally not considered to give rise to appreciable anti-competitive effects or net 
negative effects. Single branding obligations between one and  five years entered into by non-
dominant companies  usually require a proper balancing of pro- and anti-  competitive effects, 
while single branding obligations  exceeding five years are for most types of investments not 
considered necessary to achieve the claimed efficiencies or the efficiencies are not sufficient to 
outweigh their foreclosure effect” – see para. 133. 
183  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 134. 
184  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 136. 
185  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 137.  
186  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 138. 
 39
 
In relation to the countervailing power of buyers, the Guidelines recognize that 
“powerful buyers will not easily allow themselves to be cut off from the supply of 
competing goods or services”.187 Buyers may for instance request financial 
compensation, through lower purchasing prices. In such cases, the Guidelines do not 
discard competition concerns. Rather, they stress that whilst this may be beneficial to 
certain individual buyers, it “would be wrong to conclude automatically from this that 
all single branding obligations, taken together, are overall beneficial for customers 
on that market and for the final consumers”. 188  
 
Finally, in relation to the level of trade, the Guidelines draw a dividing line between 
agreements concerning final products, where foreclosure is in general more likely 
“given the significant entry barriers for most manufacturers to start retail outlets just 
for their own products”.189 In contrast, if the agreement concerns the supply of a final 
product at the wholesale level, the Guidelines are more optimistic. They consider that 
there is “no real risk of anticompetitive foreclosure if competing manufacturers can 
easily establish their own wholesaling operation”.190  
 
2.2.3. Efficiencies and objective justifications 
 
Once a vertical agreement is found to create actual or likely anticompetitive effects, 
the issue of an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU arises.191 As 
explained above, vertical restraints have a number of objective justifications and 
produce redeeming efficiencies. For each group of vertical restraint, the Guidelines 
provide clarifications on admissible objective justifications and pro-competitive 
efficiencies. 
 
                                               
187  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 137. 
188  Idem. 
189  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 140 
190  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 139. This will in turn depend on the type of product. 
191  On condition that that the supplier does not occupy a dominant position. See the Guidelines, supra 
note 14, para. 127. 
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As far as single branding is concerned, the Guidelines recognize that the supplier may 
seek (i) protection from free-riding by other suppliers (e.g. on promotional efforts);192 
(ii) protection of a relation-specific investment made by the supplier (e.g. in 
equipment which can be used only to produce components for a particular buyer);193 
(iii) protection from hold-up problems that may arise with the transfer of substantial 
know-how (which cannot be taken back by the supplier);194 (iv) to overcome capital 
market imperfections (e.g. it is more efficient for the supplier to provide a loan than it 
is for a bank).195 Interestingly, the Guidelines also declare that quantity forcing is as 
equally efficient as single branding, but generates less restrictive effects on 
competition.196 
 
With only very few exceptions, the Guidelines provide scant guidance on the level of 
sophistication required in the assessment of objective justifications and efficiency 
benefits.197 In this regard, parties should thus seek guidance from the Commission’s 
Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty (the “General 
Guidelines”).  
 
In practice, parties should proceed with caution. Competition authorities are often 
conservative when it comes to weighing efficiency arguments. To be fair, their 
scepticism is understandable. Most objective justifications for vertical restraints 
indeed hinge on behavioural speculations (incentives of buyers), rather than on 
structural efficiencies (quantitative costs savings). Such justifications are thus 
inevitably tainted with value judgment. To take a simple example, a supplier imposing 
a single branding obligation may simply, but legitimately, over-estimate the risk of 
parasitism. Hence, it is imperative that firms conduct an objective and rigorous 
                                               
192  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 144. It is of course understandable that a supplier who has 
funded significant promotional efforts may seek to defend itself against parasitic competitors. In 
this context, the appropriate vertical restraint will be (i) of the non-compete type or quantity-
forcing type when the investment is made by the supplier; and (ii) of the exclusive distribution, 
exclusive customer allocation or exclusive supply type when the investment is made by the buyer. 
193  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 146. In the same vein, in the case of client-specific 
investments where, for example, an investment made by the supplier – after termination of the 
agreement – cannot be used by the supplier to supply other customers and can only be sold at a 
significant loss, a single branding obligation covering the amortization period of the investment is 
likely to meet the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
194  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 148. 
195  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 147. 
196  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 145. 
197 The Guidelines nonetheless provide two examples of self assessment for non compete obligations 
and quantity forcing. 
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assessment of the possible efficiencies of their vertical agreements. In addition, firms 
should keep all supportive evidence of any efficiency benefits (should subsequent 
administrative or judicial proceedings be launched). 
 
IV.  ONLINE DISTRIBUTION 
 
1. THE CONTEXT 
 
Up until the adoption of the new EU framework on vertical restraints, the issue of 
online distribution triggered intense debate.198 In essence, pure Internet players (e.g. 
firms like eBay),199 argued that under Regulation 2970/1990 firms operating selective 
distribution networks had been free to undermine online distribution, through various 
types of vertical restraint.200 For instance, it was reported that suppliers operating 
selective distribution systems had occasionally prohibited the setting up of a website, 
subordinated online sales to the observance of a recommended price, placed a cap on 
quantities sold through the Internet, etc.201 In a document entitled “Empowering 
Consumers by Promoting Access to the 21st Century Market, A Call for Action”, eBay 
thus proposed to eradicate such restraints through a new hardcore restriction, whose 
proposed wording would read as follows:  
 
                                               
198  The debate on this issue started relatively early – even before the formal review process of 
Regulation 2790/1999 began – when the Competition Commissioner set up in 2008 a roundtable 
charged with discussing the future of online commerce. The work of the roundtable centred on the 
question of distribution via the Internet of audiovisual content protected by intellectual property 
rights (the iTunes case showed that European consumers could not be freely supplied throughout 
the  EU for copyright reasons). However, the roundtable also intended to discuss the online 
commerce of goods/services which are not protected by such rights. Following the publication of 
an “Issues paper” containing a list of questions for interested parties, operators active in the sector 
–whether Internet or physical operators– gave their contribution to the public debate. The majority 
of the contributions submitted tackled the issue of a possible review of the legal framework laid 
down by Regulation 2790/1999 and the Guidelines. These comments gave impetus to the debate 
on the issue of vertical restraints and distribution via the Internet. In the footnotes that follow 
some of the contributions made by relevant stakeholders during the reform process are alluded to.  
199  Others players in this context are www.rueducommerce.fr, Interactive Software Federation of 
Europe, Amazon, etc. 
200  According to eBay, supra note 92, selective distribution networks could be used in an 
anticompetitive manner in order to render on line distribution economically unattractive, for 
example.  
201  See K. Mahlstein, “Vertical Restraints and Competition Policy – Internet Sales, a New Dimension 
to be Considered”, Global Competition Policy Online, March 2009; S. Kinsella and H. Melin, 
“Who’s Afraid of the Internet? Time to Put Consumer Interests at the Heart of Competition”, 
Global Competition Policy Online, March 2009. 
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“The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to vertical agreements 
which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under 
the control of the parties, have as their object: […] (f) the restriction of the ability of 
the buyer or any of his customers to sell the contract goods or services on the Internet 
without prejudice to the exceptions permitted under paragraph b.” 
 
Unsurprisingly, those proposals were fiercely challenged by suppliers of branded 
products (cosmetics, luxury goods, jewelry, watches, etc.) which rely primarily on 
“brick and mortar” shops for the distribution of their products. They argued in 
particular that pre-and post sales services (advice, testing, etc.) on the spot represent 
significant investments at both supplier and buyer levels. Members of such networks 
may in turn be reluctant to incur them, absent protection from Internet distributors.202 
This would have been all the more problematic given the contribution of such services 
to demand growth.203  
 
Interestingly, suppliers of branded products viewed the existing regulatory framework 
as satisfactory.204 They argued that the upcoming regulatory framework should 
confirm that selective distribution entails the freedom to condition online sales upon 
the existence of a physical outlet (and other qualitative requirements related, for 
instance, to download rates, payment interfaces, search tools, etc.).205 In reality, 
suppliers operating a selective network seemed favourable to cumulative distribution 
(physical+online). Their primary cause of concern related to pure Internet distribution, 
which involves players without a physical presence. 
 
The debate over the new regulatory framework also concerned other notions, such as 
the concept of passive and active sales in exclusive distribution networks. According 
to the existing framework, Internet sales were generally deemed passive sales, which 
suppliers could not restrict. Yet, in light of technological progress, a number of 
suppliers argued that Internet sales could no longer be regarded as passive, in 
                                               
202  See on this the contribution made by the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry, pp.1-2.  
203  See the LVMH contribution, pp. 38 and 40. This is in particular true for a “touch and feel” product 
(cosmetics, etc.), which customers necessarily test in a brick and mortar shop prior to purchasing 
it. 
204  According to Estée Lauder in its contribution, the legal framework authorized the exclusion of 
‘pure players’ from selective distribution networks.  
205  See the LVMH contribution. This solution draws inspiration from French competition law, where 
the supplier can require from its physical distributors that wish to make online sales that they (i) 
already have a physical infrastructure in place which meets relevant qualitative criteria (ii) make 
the necessary investments in the site so that it has the requisite level of prestige as required within 
the network etc. 
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particular when they entail website targeted at specific customers, customer tracking, 
etc.206 Those suppliers thus argued that amendments to the regulatory framework 
ought to be introduced, so as to entitle suppliers to restrict certain Internet sales.207  
 
2. THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ONLINE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Remarkably, the new Regulation does not devote a single line to the issue of online 
distribution (as was the case with Regulation 2790/99). The issue is entirely left to the 
Guidelines which take a very favourable stance vis-a-vis online distribution.208 
Paragraph 52 of the Guidelines unambiguously declares that “the internet is a 
powerful tool to reach a greater number and variety of customers than by more 
traditional sales methods, which explains why certain restrictions on the use of the 
internet are dealt with as (re)sales restrictions. In principle, every distributor must be 
allowed to use the internet to sell products […]”. This sympathetic stance has direct 
consequences on the rules governing selective distribution (2.1.) and on the notions of 
active and passive sales (2.2.). 
 
2.1. Selective distribution and online commerce 
 
In full conformity with Article 4(c) of the Regulation, the Guidelines declare that 
within a selective distribution system, dealers should be free to sell, both actively and 
passively, to all end users, also with the help of the Internet.209 That said, the 
Guidelines also provide suppliers with some degree of control over Internet sales. Just 
as they may require quality standards for brick and mortar shops, suppliers may 
require quality standards for the use of Internet websites.210 Drawing inspiration from 
                                               
206  Chanel in its contribution considers that sales via the Internet should not be considered passive 
sales but active sales. See also the contribution made by the Premier League which challenges the 
relevance of the distinction between active and passive sales in the field of Internet distribution.  
207  In contrast see the contribution made by Which. This consumer organisation considers that there 
have been little cross border Internet sales to the detriment of consumers. See also the position of 
other players, such as Swatch, which considers that the existing distinction between passive and 
active is appropriate on the other hand. 
208  This would appear to make sense as the Commission cannot rely on any solid decisional practice 
in this context. There is in fact no European case law or decisional practice on the issue of the 
prohibition of online sales. 
209  See the Guidelines para. 56. 
210  Or for selling by catalogue or for advertising and promotion in general. See the Guidelines para. 
54.  
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the solutions promoted by the French NCA and the Paris Court of Appeals,211 the 
Guidelines even acknowledge that a supplier may require its distributors to have one 
(or more) brick and mortar shop(s) as a condition for joining the distribution system. 
In the same vein, a supplier may request distributors that use third party platforms to 
sell their products, to display the logo and brands of the contractual product on the 
website.212  
 
The Commission also considers as a “hardcore restriction” any obligation which 
dissuades dealers from using the Internet to reach a greater number (or variety) of 
customers by imposing criteria for online sales which are not equivalent to those 
imposed for sales in a brick and mortar shop.213 Importantly, this does not mean that 
the criteria for online and offline sales should be uniform.214 For example, in order to 
prevent sales to unauthorised dealers, a supplier may place a limit on the quantities 
sold by its selected dealers to an individual end-user. In such cases, the cap placed on 
sold quantities may have to be stricter for online sales, if it is easier for unauthorised 
dealers to obtain products through the Internet.215  
 
2.2.  Active and passive sales 
 
2.2.1. Internet sales are passive 
 
The Guidelines seek to provide guidance on what constitutes a passive and active sale 
in the online world. As explained previously, the concept of active and passive sales is 
primarily relevant in relation to exclusive distribution. Suppliers can restrict a 
distributor’s freedom to actively sell products in a territory that has been granted to a 
different distributor. However, unsolicited, passive sales cannot be restricted.  
 
In principle, the setting up of a website to sell a product is viewed as a passive sale, 
since it is deemed a reasonable way to allow customers to reach the distributor.216 
Surely, the use of a website may have effects beyond the distributor’s own territory 
                                               
211  See supra note 94. 
212  See the Guidelines, supra note 14,  para. 54. 
213  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 56. 
214  In practice, this restriction is likely to give rise to significant interpretation problems.  
215  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 56. 
216  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 52. 
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(or customer group). However, this stems from the technology itself, which allows 
easy access from everywhere.  
 
The Guidelines provide illustrations of passive online sales. If a customer visits the 
web site of a distributor and contacts the distributor and if such contact leads to a sale, 
including delivery, then that sale is considered passive. The same holds true if a 
customer opts to be kept (automatically) informed by the distributor and this leads to a 
sale. Finally, the fact that a distributor offers different language options on its website 
(including languages not used in its territory) does not, of itself, alter the passive 
nature of the sale.217 
 
Given, therefore, that the Guidelines consider Internet sales to be passive sales, sales 
via the Internet to another territory (or customer base) cannot be restricted on pain of 
falling within the presumption of incompatibility set out in Article 4 of the 
Regulation. In this context, the Guidelines provide four specific examples of hardcore 
restrictions of passive Internet selling: (i) agreements according to which an 
(exclusive distributor) is required to prevent customers located in another exclusive 
territory from viewing its website or to automatically re-route its customers to the 
manufacturer’s or other (exclusive) distributors’ websites;218 (ii) agreements whereby 
an (exclusive) distributor is required to terminate an Internet transaction if the credit 
card details reveal an address that is not within his exclusive territory;219 (iii) 
agreements which require that the distributor limit its proportion of overall sales made 
over the internet;220 and (iv) agreements whereby the buyer pays a higher price for 
products intended to be resold online (“dual pricing”).221 
                                               
217  See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 51  
218  See the Guidelines para. 52(a). 
219  See the Guidelines para. 52(b). 
220  See the Guidelines para. 52(c). However, a supplier may – without limiting the online sales of the 
distributor – require that the buyer sell at least a certain absolute amount (in value or volume) of 
the products offline to ensure an efficient operation of its brick and mortar shop. 
221  See the Guidelines para. 52(d) and 64. This does not exclude the situation whereby the supplier 
agrees with the buyer a fixed fee (that is, not a variable fee where the sum increases with the 
realised offline turnover as this would amount indirectly to dual pricing) to support the latter’s 
offline or online sales efforts. With regard to this latter restriction the Commission does consider, 
however, that in some specific circumstances such an agreement may fulfil the conditions of 
Article 101(3). Such circumstances may be present where a manufacturer agrees such dual pricing 
with its distributors, because selling online leads to substantially higher costs for the manufacturer 
than offline sales. In this regard the Commission provides an instructive example of a situation in 
which this may be the case: where offline sales include home installation by the distributor but 
online sales do not, the latter may lead to more customer complaints and warranty claims for the 
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2.2.2. In exceptional circumstances, Internet sales may be considered active 
 
The Guidelines merely lay down a presumption that Internet sales are passive. In 
exceptional cases, Internet sales may be considered active, and can thus be restricted. 
This is the case, for instance, if a distributor sends emails to consumers located in the 
exclusive territory of another distributor. Similarly, the Guidelines consider online 
advertisement specifically addressed to certain customers as a form of active selling to 
those customers.222 For instance, territory-based banners on third party websites are 
active sales into the territory where these banners are shown.223 Similarly, paying a 
search engine (or an online advertisement provider) to have advertisements displayed 
specifically to users in a particular territory is active selling into that territory.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
The present paper has attempted to shed some light on the new EU competition rules 
governing vertical restraints. Whilst the recently adopted regulatory framework 
provides some useful guidance on Internet distribution, it remains – to say the least – 
optimistic as regards the ability of firms to juggle with complex economic operations, 
such as market definition and market share computation. In addition, it paints a bleak 
picture of buyer power, which (i) marks a departure from conventional antitrust 
economics; and (ii) relies on fragile and untested assumptions. Practice will tell 





                                                                                                                                      
manufacturer. See also in this context the judgment handed down by the Rechtbank Zutphen, 
judgment of 8 August 2007, 79005 / HA ZA 06-716. The Dutch court held that a dual pricing 
scheme pursuant to which a supplier of built-in kitchen equipment offered less attractive pricing 
conditions to online distributors did not infringe Dutch or EU competition laws. 
222  See Guidelines, supra note 14, para 53. 
223  In general, efforts to be found specifically in a certain territory or by a certain customer group is 
active selling into that territory or to that customer group. 
